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Cross-Sectional Dispersion of Firm Valuations and Expected Stock Returns
Abstract
This paper develops two competing hypotheses for the relation between the cross-sectional
standard deviation of logarithmic firm fundamental-to-price ratios (“dispersion”) and ex-
pected aggregate returns. In models with fully rational beliefs, greater dispersion indicates
greater risk and higher expected aggregate returns. In models with investor overconfidence,
greater dispersion indicates greater mispricing and lower expected aggregate returns. Con-
sistent with the behavioral models, the results show that (1) measures of dispersion are
negatively related to subsequent market excess returns, (2) this negative relation is more
pronounced among riskier firms, and (3) dispersion is positively related to aggregate trading
volume, idiosyncratic volatility, and investor sentiment, and increases after good past market
performance.
[Keywords] Return predictability, Dispersion, Overconfidence, Investor sentiment
JEL Classification: G12, G14
I. Introduction
There is much evidence that fundamental-to-price ratios, such as the dividend-to-price and
book-to-market equity ratios, forecast stock returns both at the aggregate and in the cross
section.1 This forecast ability, however, can arise either from time-varying risk premiums or
from stock market mispricing.2 Therefore, tests that use fundamental-to-price ratios often
have both rational and behavioral explanations.
This paper takes a simple and fresh approach to test behavioral theories against ratio-
nal theories at the aggregate level. Instead of focusing on the first moment—the aggregate
fundamental-to-price ratios, this paper examines the second moment—the cross-sectional
standard deviation of logarithmic firm valuation ratios, termed dispersion. Existing rational
and behavioral models have opposite predictions regarding the relationship between disper-
sion and expected aggregate returns. Rational models of Sharpe (1964), Berk, Green, and
Naik (1999), and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) suggest a positive relation while behav-
ioral theories of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) imply a negative one. Therefore, the dispersion-return relationship can help distin-
guish behavioral from rational explanations for the aggregate return predictability. This
paper develops and tests these competing hypotheses. The empirical evidence supports the
behavioral models.
Consider a single-period version of the Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition of
the logarithmic dividend-to-price ratio with zero risk-free rates and no dividend growth,
(d− p)i ' E(ri). Suppose expected log firm return, E(ri), is approximately linearly related
to expected log market returns, E(rm), through beta, so E(ri) ' βiE(rm).3 Taking cross-
1See Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1988a), and Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and
Roberts (2007) for the dividend yield and the payout yield; Kothari and Shanken (1997), Pontiff and Schall
(1998), and Fama and French (1992) for the book-to-market equity; Lamont (1998) for the earnings-to-price
ratio, and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) for the value-to-price ratio. Recent evidence includes Goyal
and Welch (2007), Campbell and Thompson (2007), Cochrane (2007), among others.
2Examples of explanations based on risk premiums include Fama and French (1988a) and Berk (1995)
and those based on mispricing include Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (2001).
3A linear relationship between beta and discrete returns under the (I)CAPMs approximately holds for log
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sectional standard deviation of both sides in the decomposition equation yields σ(d − p) =
|E(rm)| σ(β) = E(rm)σ(β), with the second step based on a positive equity premium under
a rational framework. Thus, when cross-sectional dispersion in beta is constant, the greater
the expected equity premium, the larger the current cross-sectional dispersion in log firm
valuation ratios—implying a positive dispersion-return relation.
When the dispersion of beta, however, changes over time, as considered in the conditional
CAPMs of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), it tends
to be positively correlated with the expected market return. This variation in the beta
dispersion will reinforce the positive relation between firm valuation dispersion and expected
market returns. Therefore, these rational pricing models predict that greater dispersion
indicates greater risk and should positively forecast future aggregate returns.
In contrast, in a market with both rational and overconfident investors, firm valuation
dispersion in the cross section is positively related to individual stock and market mispricing
and negatively related to expected equity premium (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(2001), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)).4 On the one hand, overconfident investors cause
aggregate market price overreacting to market-wide information, and therefore increases ag-
gregate mispricing, |M |, where M can be positive (overpricing) or negative (underpricing).
When expected aggregate return contains aggregate mispricing, then σ(d−p) is partly deter-
mined by |M |σ(β). So greater overconfidence leads to greater firm valuation dispersion. On
the other hand, overconfident investors also tend to underestimate risk and lower market risk
premiums and expected market returns. However, over a long period of time, overreaction to
good and to bad news cancel out, leaving no net effect on average aggregate returns. Hence,
greater overconfidence leads to both larger dispersion and lower average subsequent equity
returns with small risk-free rates or short intervals (e.g., Cochrane (2001) (pp.32, pp.103), Brennan, Wang,
and Xia (2004)).
4Overconfidence refers to the tendency of investors to overestimate their own signal precision. It leads
to overweighting private information or one’s own judgement. As a behavioral trait, overconfidence has
been widely identified by experimental studies in psychology (e.g., Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Lichtenstein,
Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982), Camerer (1995)) and a growing finance literature has used overconfidence to
explain a large set of stock market phenomena (e.g., Kyle andWang (1997), Odean (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam (1998), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006)).
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premium.
In addition, when overreaction and mispricing also occur to firm-specific news, the effect
of overconfidence on dispersion will be greater. In that case, firm valuation dispersion also
reflects the dispersion of firm-specific mispricings. When overconfidence is stronger, firm
mispricings, so firm valuations, will be more dispersed in the cross section. Built upon exist-
ing behavioral models, I derive the above effects and show that variation in overconfidence
can induce a negative relation between dispersion and expected aggregate returns.
In the empirical tests, I form a composite measure of dispersion that incorporates cross-
sectional standard deviations of three logarithmic firm valuation ratios: the book-to-market
equity, dividend-to-price, and earnings-to-price ratios. I call this composite measure cross-
firm valuation dispersion (CVD). Another measure, CVDr, is formed similarly but accounts
for the cross-sectional differences in profitability or growth rates reflected in firm valuation
ratios. Both dispersion measures are adjusted for an upward time trend, likely caused by
the divergence of firm characteristics over time (Fama and French (2004)), and incorporated
into the composite measures using only prior information that is available to the market at
each point in time. Then I test whether the dispersion measures positively or negatively
forecast subsequent aggregate returns.
My results are consistent with the behavioral models. I find that during 1963–2006 both
dispersion measures are negative predictors of subsequent market excess returns at horizons
as short as three months and as long as three years ahead. This forecast ability is, however,
stronger for value-weighted excess returns than for equal-weighted ones. In addition, the
dispersion measures are negatively correlated with aggregate log fundamental-to-price ratios,
as measured relative to their long-run trend. When expected cash flows are given, a lower
aggregate fundamental-to-price ratio generally indicates lower expected aggregate returns.
Therefore, this evidence again suggests that expected equity premium tends to decrease
when dispersion rises.
To further examine the behavioral explanation for the dispersion-return relationship,
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I provide three sets of additional evidence. First, I find that, supporting the behavioral
models, the negative dispersion-return relationship is more pronounced among riskier firms,
such as firms with higher beta or larger return volatility. This holds both before and after
the controls for a set of common comovement in returns. Conditional on a high CVD state—
indicating greater mispricing—a positive risk-return tradeoff is gone or even reverses out in
the cross section.
Second, I find that the dispersion measures are positively correlated with other aggregate
indicators of investor overconfidence, including aggregate trading volume, aggregate idiosyn-
cratic volatility, and past market performance. These results are consistent with behavioral
models (e.g., Odean (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Gervais and
Odean (2001), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)) predicting that investor overconfidence
generates excess trading and excess volatility, and that overconfidence tends to grow after
past trading success, caused by biased self-attribution.5
Finally, I show an interesting link between the dispersion measures and the sentiment
index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). My dispersion measures are highly positively correlated
with the sentiment index. Additionally, the dispersion measures can forecast the sentiment
index at one-year ahead. In particular, the peak of the dispersion measures occurs in 2000,
which is also the peak of the sentiment index and that of the tech bubble in the late 90’s.
My results have practical values for predicting aggregate returns. Goyal and Welch (2007)
show that most, if not all, well-known aggregate predictors do not beat the historical mean
equity premium in forecasting future market returns out of the sample.6 Using a similar
method, I find that the dispersion measures forecast the equity premium better than the
historical mean premium in real time. In addition, trading strategies that are long on either
the most or the least risky stocks, conditional on dispersion, beat a buy-and-hold market
strategy by 118% to 260% during the period 1965–2006.
5Biased self-attribution refers to the tendency to attribute one’s success to own ability but failure to bad
luck.
6For dissenting opinions, see Campbell and Thompson (2007), Cochrane (2007), and Lettau and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2007).
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Related to the literature on the small value-spread (Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004),
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)),7 my results suggest that the ability of the value spread
to forecast market returns may neither be unique to small firms nor be confined in short
horizons. More importantly, I show in the model section that the value spread does not
help disentangle risk from mispricing while the dispersion measures do. My findings also
differ from those by Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006), who forecast aggregate re-
turns using the slope coefficients from regressions of firm fundamental-to-price ratios on firm
betas. Their measures, like the aggregate fundamental-to-price ratios, are directly linked
to the expected market return, which do not help differentiate the behavioral from rational
explanations. Also, Polk et al. show that the forecast power of their measures is strong from
1927–1965 but weak from 1965–2002, while mine are significant return predictors after 1965.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the models and
develop the test hypotheses. Section III describes the data and the key variables. Section
IV provides the empirical results. Section V summarizes and draws conclusions.
II. The Model
In this section, I will first present the model with both rational and overconfident investors.
The model with fully rational investors resembles the CAPM, and is developed as a special
case of the model with overconfidence by setting the overconfidence level as zero.
The model setting is built upon that of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)
(hereafter DHS (2001)), which ties a factor model with both investor overconfidence and
multiple securities.8 In the model, There are two equally populated groups of risk averse
7The small value-spread is defined as the difference of the logarithmic book-to-market equity between the
value and the growth firms among small stocks. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) introduce the value
spread across all firms, including small ones.
8The current model assumes risk aversion of rational investors as a form of limits to arbitrage. As an
alternative approach, one can assume risk-neutral investors and add short-sale constraints to produce the
negative dispersion-return relationship (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). In this approach, investors tend to
bid up stock prices because they anticipate to sell the stock in the future to more optimistic investors at the
presence of short-sale constraints. Thus, securities tend to be overpriced, so is the aggregate market, which
leads to greater dispersion and lower expected returns.
5
investors, one rational, denoted as subscript R, and the other overconfident, denoted as
subscript C.9 Investors hold one riskless asset and N risky assets. There are three dates,
t = 0, 1, 2. At date 0, investors start with their endowments and identical prior beliefs about
the security payoffs. It is known to all investors that, at date 2, the riskless asset pays one
unit per share and the risky asset pays θi, for all i = 1, ..., N . At date 1, investors receive
an identical noisy private signal about the payoff of the common factor and exchange assets
based on their beliefs. At date 2, the risky asset pays a liquidating dividend of θ and all
consumption takes place.
Each risky asset has per capita supply of Q shares and its payoff at date 2 follows a
single-factor structure:
θi = θ¯i + βiF + ²i. (1)
where θ¯i is the expected payoff of security i, ²i is the firm-specific payoff, independently
identically distributed as N(0, 1/v²), and βi is the loading of the ith security on the factor
F . The common factor F is normally distributed as N(0, 1/v). In addition, E(F²i) = 0.
The security loading, β, takes the values of β1,..., βN . I normalize the factor F to set the
average β as one and denote cross-sectional variance of β as σ2(β). The values of θ¯i, βi, and
the distribution of ²i and F are common knowledge, but the realizations of ²i and F are not
known until date 2.
The noisy private signal about the common factor payoff at date 1 takes the form
S = F + e, (2)
where e is the noise of the signal. It is normally distributed as N(0, 1/vR), where vR is
the true/rational precision of the signal. Overconfident investors mistakenly believe that the
variance of the noise is lower, 1/vC < 1/vR (i.e., vC > vR). Thus, for overconfident investors,
9The main conclusions of the model hold for any non-negligible fraction of overconfident population. As
shown by DHS (2001), the equilibrium asset prices reflect the average overconfidence of investors. Thus, the
assumption about the fraction of the overconfident population is not essential for deriving the main results.
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the mean and variance of the common factor payoff conditioning on the signals are given by:
µC =
vCS
v + vC
, σ2C =
1
v + vC
.
In contrast, for rational investors, the conditional mean and variance are given by
µR =
vRS
v + vR
, σ2R =
1
v + vR
.
Note that when good news arrives (S > 0), µC > µR, while when bad news arrives (S < 0),
µC < µR. That is, the expected payoff is systematically mis-estimated by overconfident
investors to the direction of the news. Also note that σ2C < σ
2
R, suggesting that overconfident
investors underestimate cash flow risks.
After receiving the private signals, each investor selects her portfolio to maximize a CARA
utility function with a risk aversion coefficient of A for date 2 consumption. Appendix
A shows the solution to the equilibrium price of the market, Pm = µR + γl − Aσ2RCQ
(see Appendix A for definition of terms). For brevity, let M denote the misestimation of
expected aggregate cash flows, γl, termed “cash flow mean bias,” and pi denote the market
risk premium, Aσ2RCQ. Then the aggregate price Pm can be written as
Pm = µR +M − pi. (3)
Accordingly, the rationally expected aggregate return, E(Rm), defined as µR − Pm, is deter-
mined by both risk premium and cash flow mean bias:
E(Rm) = pi −M. (4)
Similar to DHS (2001), valuation of asset i is measured by Ci − Pi, where Ci is a noisy
measure of the true expected cash flow of asset i conditional on the factor signal, and Pi is
equilibrium price of asset i. In the DHS (2001) model framework, return is measured in units
of consumptions, so asset valuations are measured with the differences between cash flows
and prices. Empirically, Ci − Pi can be proxied by log fundamental-to-price ratios, which
are approximately linearly related to expected log returns (Campbell and Shiller (1988)). It
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is easy to show that Pi is determined by its unconditional expected cash flow and its cash
flow sensitivity to the common factor.10 Thus,
Pi = θ¯i + βiPm, and (5)
Ci = θ¯i + βiµR + νi, (6)
where νi is a firm-specific noise, independently identically distributed as N(0, σ
2
ν), and
E[βiνi] = 0.
Combining equations (3), (5), and (6) yields a simple relationship between asset i’s
valuation and the market’s valuation,
Ci − Pi = βiE(Rm) = βi(pi −M) + νi. (7)
Taking the cross-sectional variance of both sides of equation (7) and define the adjusted
cross-sectional variance σˆ2(C − P ) = σ2(C − P )− σ2ν produces
σˆ(C − P ) = σ(β) |E(RM)| = σ(β) |pi −M | . (8)
This equation shows that dispersion in firm valuations is determined by the absolute expected
market returns multiplied by the dispersion of beta.
In equilibrium, both firm valuation dispersion and expected aggregate returns are en-
dogenous. Thus, their relationship is usually determined by the exogenous variables that are
shifted. In the model based on overconfidence, we consider the shift in the overconfidence
parameter, vC . In the model with full rationality, we examine the shift in either investor risk
aversion, A, or cash flow volatility, 1/v.
We first consider the shift in overconfidence. Variation in overconfidence is consistent
with findings from experimental studies of psychology.11 Prior overconfidence-based models
10This relationship can be easily derived from a non-arbitrage argument: since the payoff of asset i can be
replicated by holding θ¯i units of the riskfree asset, βi units of the market portfolio, and one unit of ²i, the
price of asset i should be equal to the sum of the prices of the three components in which ²i is not priced
since it is diversifiable.
11For example, it has been found that people tend to be more overconfident when individuals perform
challenging judgment tasks (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982)), and when feedback is vague
and deferred (e.g., Einhorn (1980)).
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(Odean (1998), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) ) have studied the impacts of variation in
overconfidence on price bubbles, excess volatility, and trading frequency.12
Through comparative statics we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. As overconfidence vC increases,
1. If overconfidence is sufficiently strong (vC > vC
′
, where vC
′
is a constant), then on average
the adjusted cross-sectional dispersion of firm valuations σˆ(C − P ) increases; and
2. The expected aggregate return on average decreases.
See Appendix A for proof of all propositions.
Thus, in a sufficiently overconfident market, larger firm valuation dispersion on average
should precede lower aggregate returns.
The intuition is two-fold. First, consider the effects of overconfidence on firm valuation
dispersion through two extreme cases. In Case 1 there is no risk premium (pi = 0). Hence,
σˆ(C − P ) = σ(β) |M |. When overconfidence rises, |M | increases, and so is firm valuation
dispersion. In Case 2 there is no mean bias (M = 0). Hence, σˆ(C − P ) = σ(β)pi. When
overconfidence is stronger, pi decreases, and so is dispersion. That is, both an increase in
mean bias and a decrease in risk premium drive firm valuation dispersion. But the two
effects are not equally strong. Appendix A shows that, as overconfidence rises, the increase
in the mean bias dominates the decrease in risk premiums, owing to the stronger effect of
overestimation of signal precision on the conditional mean than on the conditional variance.
Therefore, when overconfidence becomes sufficiently strong, dispersion is determined by the
aggregate mean bias.
Second, the decrease in risk premiums causes a decline in the average aggregate returns.
Recall from equation (4) that the expected aggregate return conditional on private signals
is pi −M . On average the expected aggregate return is equal to pi because cash flow mean
12Empirical evidence in finance also suggests that overconfidence is not constant (Kumar (2008), Zhang
(2006), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)).
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overestimation (M > 0) and underestimation (M < 0) are symmetric.13 Thus, the upward
bias and the downward bias cancel out. As a result, the mean bias effect does not influence
the average aggregate return. The risk premium pi, however, decreases with overconfidence
due to the risk premium reduction effect. Therefore, the expected aggregate return is on
average low when the overconfidence level is high. Taken together, variation in overconfidence
can cause a negative dispersion-return relation.
So far the model considers only the impact of investor overreaction to market-wide news.
But what if investors also receive and overreact to firm-specific news? A simple analysis
shows that overreaction to firm-specific news can further enhance the negative dispersion-
return relation. Denote firm-specific mispricing as mi. Given the distribution of firm-specific
payoffs, overconfidence and overreaction increase cross-sectional dispersion of firm-specific
mispricing, σ(m). Since in this case σˆ(C − P ) is also determined by σ(m), firm valuation
dispersion is larger when overconfidence is stronger. Again, this implies a negative relation
between dispersion and expected equity premium.
What about a rational framework? In this case, we consider how the shift in risk aversion
or in factor cash flow volatility affects the dispersion-return relation. Now that overconfidence
is absent (vC = vR) and the CAPM holds.14 Since expectations are rational (M = 0), the
adjusted firm valuation dispersion collapses to
σˆ(C − P ) = σ(β)pi. (9)
The above equation then leads to
Proposition 2. As risk aversion A or factor cash flow volatility 1/v increases,
1. The adjusted cross-sectional dispersion of firm valuation σˆ(C − P ) increases; and
2. The expected aggregate return increases.
Thus, if variation in expected returns is due to variation in rational risk premiums, greater
13Since S is normally distributed with zero mean, cash flow misestimation is symmetric in both magnitude
and probability. Thus, the unconditional mean of M is zero.
14DHS (2001) show that the unconditional CAPM holds when overconfidence is absent in their model.
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firm valuation dispersion should on average precede higher aggregate returns. Intuitively,
when risk aversion or factor cash flow volatility is high, the market risk premium is high,
which increases both firm valuation dispersion and the expected aggregate return.
In the current model σ(β) is assumed constant. In reality, however, σ(β) can be time-
varying. How does the change in σ(β) affect the return predictability based on firm valuation
dispersion? Existing rational models suggest that this change is likely to strengthen a positive
dispersion-return relationship. For instance, in the model of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999),
in each period firms choose investment projects based on the riskiness of the growth options.
Other things equal, low beta projects are more attractive. Therefore, a larger cross-sectional
dispersion of beta must indicate that firms are taking riskier projects at the margin. As a
result, the aggregate market becomes riskier and is expected to deliver higher returns.
In Appendix C, using the same set of parameters as Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), I
simulate a large panel of firm-month data. The three figures show that, under the Berk
et al. (1999) model, firm valuation dispersion is positively related to expected aggregate
returns and one-quarter/one-year ahead realized aggregate returns. Similar intuitions apply
to the model of Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003). Indeed, the model by Gomes et al. shows
that (pp.723, Figure 5, and pp. 725, Figure 7) the cross-sectional dispersion of logarithmic
book-to-market equity and the dispersion of firm betas have negative relationships with the
log price-to-dividend ratio of the market. This implies a positive relationship between firm
valuation dispersion, beta dispersion, and expected aggregate returns.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 provide testable competing hypotheses; the over-
confidence model predicts a negative dispersion-return relationship while the rational model
predicts a positive relationship between the two. In contrast, the relationship between the
value spread and the expected aggregate return carries the same sign under the two models.
Let the average beta of the value firms be βv and that of the growth firms be βg. When the
number of firms in each group is sufficiently large, the value spread is
(C − P )v − (C − P )g = (βv − βg)E(Rm). (10)
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Thus, the relationship between the value spread and the expected aggregate returns is de-
termined by βv − βg regardless of whether the variation in the expected return is caused by
variation in rational risk premiums or in mispricing. A number of studies (e.g., Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004)) find that growth stocks on average have higher beta than value stocks
after 1963. Therefore, equation (10) predicts that the value spread should be negatively re-
lated to the expected aggregate return. This negative relationship between the value spread
and expected aggregate returns, however, does not help differentiate a behavioral theory
from a rational theory.
Furthermore, since β is a multiplier on the expected aggregate return, the two hypotheses
have implications for the cross section of stock returns.
Proposition 3.
1. As overconfidence vC increases, ceteris paribus, the reduction in the expected returns of
assets with higher betas are on average greater than those of assets with lower betas.
2. However, if investors are rational (vC = vR), as risk aversion A or factor cash flow
volatility 1/v increases, the increase in the expected return of assets with higher beta is
greater than that of assets with lower betas.
Thus, based upon the overconfidence model, the negative dispersion-return relation
should be stronger among sets of high beta firms; when overconfidence reduces the mar-
ket risk premium, it should reduce the risk premium of high beta stocks more than that of
low beta stocks. Following a similar reasoning, the rational model predicts that high beta
stocks should exhibit a stronger positive dispersion-return relationship.
Taken together, I develop two sets of competing hypotheses.
Hypothesis I
a. (The risk hypothesis) Firm valuation dispersion should be positively related to subse-
quent aggregate stock returns.
b. (The mispricing hypothesis) Firm valuation dispersion should be negatively related to
subsequent aggregate stock returns.
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Hypothesis II
a. (The risk hypothesis) The positive dispersion-return relation should be most pro-
nounced among risky firms.
b. (The mispricing hypothesis) The negative dispersion-return relation should be most
pronounced among risky firms.
It is worth remarking that the behavioral hypothesis does not exclude the influence of
risk in the equity premium. Under the behavioral framework, a negative relation between
dispersion and future aggregate returns only suggests the presence of mispricing and its
stronger impact on the dispersion-return relation than risk.
III. Data
The main sample includes common stocks (share code 10 and 11) listed in NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ from July 1963 to December 2006, excluding financials (SIC between 6000
and 6999) and utilities (SIC between 4900 and 4949). Stock trading data are obtained from
the Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Accounting information is obtained from
COMPUSTAT.
I calculate cross-sectional standard deviations of three logarithmic firm valuation ratios:
log book-to-market equity (b − p), log dividend-to-price (d − p), and log earnings-to-price
(e−p); and denote the respective standard deviations as σ(b−p), σ(d−p), and σ(e−p). These
measures are later incorporated for a parsimonious composite measure. Following convention
in the literature, book equity, dividends, and earnings in fiscal year end as of December of
year t−1 are used to form the dispersion measures from the end of June of year t to the end
of May of year t+1. The annual dispersion measures are computed at the end of each June
using the end-of-June market equity. The quarterly dispersion measures are computed at the
end of each March, June, September, and December using the end-of-quarter market equity.
Firm book equity is calculated following Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006). Market
equity is the product of stock price and shares outstanding. Firm book-to-market equity is
13
book equity over market equity. Firm dividend-to-price ratio is total dividends paid (data
21) over market equity. Firm earnings-to-price ratio is net income from continuing operation
(data 178) over market equity. Zero or negative book equity, dividends, and earnings are
excluded to calculate logarithmic ratios.15
—–INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE—–
Panels A to C of Figure 1 plot the time series of the annual dispersion variables σ(b− p),
σ(d−p), and σ(e−p), measured at the end of each June. These series show an upward time
trend. Preliminary analyses show that a time index accounts for 30-70% of the variation of
these series. Common practice in the literature is to detrend a time series before making
forecasts on returns (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006)). Before detrending, however, it is
important to understand the source of the time trend to avoid potential data-mining.
According to Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Vuolteenaho (2000), log book-to-market
equity (b − p) and log dividend-to-price ratio (d − p) contain not only a component of
expected returns but also a component of expected growth rate. In particular, b− p reflects
the return on equity (roe) and d−p captures the log growth rate of dividend payout (∆d) (see
Appendix B for equations). Following a similar derivation, I show in Appendix B that the
log earnings-to-price ratio e− p is related to the growth rate of earnings (∆e). Accordingly,
the cross-sectional dispersion in b−p, d−p, and e−p should also reflect the dispersion in roe,
∆d, and ∆e across firms. Hence, it is likely that the divergence of the firm expected growth
rates and profitability cause a divergence of log firm valuation ratios over time. Indeed, Fama
and French (2004)) find that the dispersion of firm growth rates and that of profitability have
become larger.
To further verify my conjecture, for firms that are included in computing the firm valua-
tion dispersion, I calculate cross-sectional standard deviation of the three log growth rates,
15Excluding the negative values results in a truncated distribution of firm valuation ratios, which might
raise a concern about whether the truncation drives the results. As a robustness check, I use sales-to-price
ratios to calculate firm valuation dispersion and still observe the negative correlation between dispersion
and aggregate returns. Sales are usually positive and should include a more complete set of firms in my
dispersion measure.
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denoted respectively as, σ(roe), σ(∆d), and σ(∆e), in which roe is defined as earnings over
the average of current book equity and book equity lagged by one year. As shown in Panels
D, E, and F of Figure 1, dispersion of firm growth rates exhibits a similar time trend to
those in the valuation dispersion measures. That is, the time-trends in σ(b − p), σ(d − p),
and σ(e−p) are likely to be caused by a divergence in firm profitability over time that is not
captured in my models. Therefore, filtering the time trend should not change the insights of
the results to distinguish the two hypotheses.
—–INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE—–
To avoid a potential look-ahead bias (Brennan and Xia (2005)), my detrending method
involves only prior information. Specifically, from June of year t to May of t+ 1, I subtract
each monthly dispersion measures by its 36-month moving average from year t− 3 to t− 1.
That is, the long-run trend does not include dispersion within the most recent six to eighteen
months. So this method preserves the short-term variation in dispersion, which intends to
capture either the changes in general economic conditions or in misvaluation waves that
usually last for a period of time.16
These detrended series, denoted as cd(b − p), cd(d − p), and cd(e − p), are plotted on
Panels A to C of Figure 2. Cross-firm valuation dispersion (CVD) is defined as the first
principal component of cd(b− p), cd(d− p), and cd(e− p), where the weight on each of the
three components for CVD at month t is generated using all data available in that month.17
Again, the purpose is to avoid a possible look-ahead bias. The weights, in fact, have little
variation over time and are usually around 0.34. I require at least 12-month observations to
extract the principal component. Thus, the first observation of CVD starts from June 1965.
As discussed previously, log firm valuations also proxy for expected growth rates. To
obtain a cleaner proxy for expected returns, I run a cross-sectional regression of each log
16Alternative definitions of long-term trends, such as the moving average over year t to t − 5, do not
change the main findings. When the long-term trend is identified using the full sample, the main results are
stronger.
17For example, CVD in June of 1986 is formed based on the weights of the three detrended series on the
first principal component that are estimated using data from the beginning of the sample to June, 1986.
These weighted are then updated in June of 1987 to form the annual CVD of that month.
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firm valuation ratios on its corresponding growth rates, and defined the residuals as the
residual log firm valuation ratios. I then define the cross-sectional standard deviations of
the residuals as σ(b− p)r, σ(d− p)r, and σ(e− p)r. These series are detrended, as discussed
previously, denoted as cd(b−p)r, cd(d−p)r, and cd(e−p)r. Their first principal component,
again using only prior information, is defined as the residual cross-firm valuation dispersion
(CVDr).
—–INSERT TABLE 1 HERE—–
The summary statistics of all the dispersion measures are reported in Table 1. At each
point in time CVD and CVDr are constructed to have zero mean and unit variance. Since the
window is updated month by month, the full sample CVD and CVDr have means of −0.55
and −0.77, and standard deviations of 1.23 and 1.16. Comparing to the non-detrended
dispersion and residual dispersion measures, the detrended dispersion measures, CVD, and
CVDr have much smaller autocorrelations (around 0.50), suggesting less persistency after
detrending, which can help make more reliable forecasts of future aggregate returns (Stam-
baugh (1986)).
The two CVDs have a high correlation of 0.95 at the monthly level (Panel C) and 0.94
at annual level (Panel B). They are also highly correlated with the underlying measures,
shown in Panel B, suggesting that they capture major variation (which is around 85%)
contained in the underlying measures. Their time series, plotted in Panels D of Figure 2,
share remarkably similar trends and waves. Interestingly, three notable peaks in both CVD
and CVDr, around the periods 1967 to 1968, 1980 to 1981, and 2000, all coincide with those
in the sentiment index (Baker and Wurgler (2006)), as characterized by industry fads, hot
IPOs, and technology bubbles, respectively.
IV. Empirical Tests
I first present the main tests on the relationship between dispersion, aggregate valuation
ratios, and aggregate returns. Then, I present additional evidence that dispersion is likely
16
to measure aggregate investor overconfidence and sentiment.
A. Forecasting aggregate returns
The rational hypothesis states a positive relation between dispersion and future aggregate
returns, which implies a positive relation between dispersion and aggregate fundamental-
to-price ratios. In contrast, the mispricing hypothesis predicts that dispersion is negatively
related to future aggregate returns and to current aggregate fundamental-to-price ratios.
1. Correlation with aggregate valuation ratios
The aggregate book-to-market equity, dividends-to-price, and earnings-to-price ratios are
calculated as the value-weighted average of firm valuation ratios including only firms that are
used to compute the dispersion measure CVD. The results are similar if I use the aggregate
valuation ratios based on S&P 500 index prices and fundamentals, reported by Goyal and
Welch (2007). To linearize the relation between aggregate valuation ratios and expected
equity premium, I take logarithm on the aggregate valuation ratios. In preliminary analyses,
I find that all three aggregate log valuation ratios exhibit similar patterns: they rise during
the 1960s until the early 1980s, then decline substantially through 2000, and then increase
again. Similar to Goyal and Welch (2007), I also find that these aggregate valuation ratios
have insignificant power to forecast equity premium after 1965.
The aggregate valuation ratios do not appear to have significant relationship with my
dispersion measures, either. This lack of significant correlations can be caused by detrending
the dispersion series. Recall that CVD and CVDr, by construction, reflect more short-term
variation in dispersion relative to its long-run trend. The aggregate valuation ratios are
dominated by their long-run trend. A diagnostic test, therefore, should use the change in
the aggregate valuation ratios relative to its long-run trend to examine its correlation with
CVD or CVDr that is independent from the common time trend. Thus, I subtract the
monthly moving average from year t− 3 to t− 1 to aggregate valuation measures from June
of t to May of t+1, similar to that used for the dispersion measures, and denote the residual
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variables as b − p, d − p, and e − p. Then I test whether CVD and CVDr are positively or
negatively correlated with b− p, d− p, and e− p.
Shown in Panel C of Table 1, CVD and CVDr are negatively correlated with aggregate
b − p, d − p, and e − p, with all correlations significant at the 1% level.18 In other words,
firm valuations tend to become more dispersed when aggregate market prices relative to
fundamentals become higher, following which the equity premium is likely to be lower. The
evidence is consistent with the mispricing hypothesis that dispersion increases with aggregate
market prices but inconsistent with the rational hypothesis that states the opposite.
2. Sorts
Next, I move to the correlation between CVD/CVDr and future aggregate returns. Before
running predictive regressions, I first examine the aggregate return patterns conditioning on
beginning-of-period CVD. The CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted index compounded
returns from 1963 to 2006 are used as aggregate stock returns. Based on whether the end-
of-June CVD is above or below its historical mean up to each June, I sort the subsequent
three consecutive 12-month market excess returns following June. In other words, the sorting
results represent tradable portfolios at the point of the forecast. Shown in Figure 3, during
the full sample period, in Panels A and B, when CVD is relatively low, the average next three
12-month value-weighted market excess returns are 6.82%, 8.80%, and 6.63%. In contrast,
when CVD is relatively high, these average excess returns are 0.19%, 1.68%, and 2.95%,
abysmal and even negative. The negative risk premium is at odds with the rational model
where the risk premium must be positive.
—–INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE—–
Equal-weighted market excess returns exhibit similar patterns. Following low CVD pe-
riods the annual market excess returns are 9–10%, while following high CVD periods these
18I also find that non-detrended dispersion measures, σ(b− p), σ(d− p), and σ(e− p), all have significant
negative correlations with the non-detrended log aggregate valuation ratios. However, these correlations
can be attributed an upward time trend in the raw dispersion measures and a downward time trend in the
aggregate valuation measures from the early 1980s to 2000. Therefore, I focus on the tests with detrended
measures.
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excess returns are 3–5%. To make sure the poor performance following high CVD period is
not solely driven by the post-1997 bubble period, I conduct sorts based on CVD from 1963 to
1996 and report the results in Panels C and D of Figure 3. The return patterns conditioning
on CVD remain qualitatively similar. The unreported results conditioning on CVDr paint a
similar picture. Thus, these results suggest a negative relationship between dispersion and
future equity premium, which supports the mispricing hypothesis.
3. Univariate regressions
To formally evaluate the predictive power of CVD, I regress market excess returns on lagged
CVD or CVDr. Both value- and equal-weighted market returns are used. I report results on
three different return horizons: one quarter, one year, and three years. The results for other
return horizons from one month to three years are qualitatively similar. For one-quarter-
ahead returns, the predictors are updated at the end of each March, June, September, and
December. For one-year-ahead or three-year-ahead returns, they are updated annually at the
end of each June. Overlapping observations are used for the three-year return regressions.
The OLS coefficients and R2 are reported in Table 2. Since the OLS t-statistics may be
subject to the small sample bias (Stambaugh (1986, 1999)), I report the one-tail p-value based
on the simulated distribution of the predictive slope following Nelson and Kim (1993).19
—–INSERT TABLE 2 HERE—–
Panel A of Table 2 reports the predictive regression results using CVD and Panel B
reports those with CVDr. As can be seen, the coefficients of CVD and CVDr are all negative.
For value-weighted returns, the coefficients are −1.16%, −4.17% and −11.67%, all significant
at the 5% level. Given a one standard deviation increase in CVD (which is 1.23), these
coefficients imply a reduction of returns by 1.43%, 5.13%, and 14.35% at three horizons.
19Stambaugh points out that the OLS estimator in a predictive regression will be biased to favor the
alternative in a small sample if (1) the regressor is highly persistent and (2) the innovation of the predicted
variable and that of the forecaster are correlated. Shown in Table 1, the first-order autocorrelations of CVD
and CVDr are both 0.51, suggesting CVD is relatively persistent. Furthermore, preliminary analyses find
that shocks to the expected market returns are correlated with shocks to CVD. Thus, the bias is likely to
be present.
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The R2 range from 2-3% for one-quarter ahead returns to 14-21% for three-year ahead
returns, suggesting non-negligible forecast power of CVD on future aggregate returns. The
results using CVDr are similar, although with lower R2 in regressions. For equal-weighted
returns, the coefficients of CVD and CVDr are marginally significant for three-year returns
but insignificant for one-quarter and one-year returns. However, they remain negative and
economically significant.
4. Out-of-sample forecasts
A recent strand of literature debates about whether aggregate predictors have practical
values for investors to forecast equity premium. In particular, Goyal and Welch (2007) argue
that historical mean equity premium better forecasts aggregate excess returns than most,
if not all, well-known aggregate return predictors. Given the debate, it is helpful to assess
whether CVD and CVDr add power to forecast aggregate returns, relative to the historical
mean equity premium.
Following Goyal and Welch, I perform the out-of-sample (OSS) forecasts based on CVD
or CVDr. Specifically, in each quarter or year, I make forecasts of equity premium in the next
quarter or year based on regression coefficients using information up to that point in time.
The initial estimates are obtained using a 20-year period data, from June of 1965 to June of
1984. I compute the squared forecast error (SFE) from the model based on CVD or CVDr
(the alternative), denoted as SFEA, and from the model based on historical mean (the null),
denoted as SFEN . These squared forecast errors are cumulated period-by-period. Finally,
the cumulative SFE difference is defined as the cumulative SFEN minus the cumulative
SFEA. That is, the better the alternative model performs, the lower the SFEA relative to
SFEN , and the greater the cumulative SFE difference.
—–INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE—–
The cumulative SFE differences based on CVD and CVDr are plotted in Figure 4, with
quarterly forecasts in Panel A and annual forecasts in Panel B. An increase in the line means
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that the alternative model performs better, and vice versa when the line decreases. When
the line stands above zero, the cumulative performance of the proposed model is superior to
the null model that uses the historical mean equity premium. The picture is clear; the OSS
performance of CVD-based forecasts beats that based on the historical mean equity premium.
The cumulative SFE difference is always above zero, for both quarterly and annual forecasts,
and tends to increase over time. The CVDr-based models perform slightly less strongly than
CVD. In the 90’s, the CVDr-based quarterly OSS performance is slightly beaten by the naive
model. The forecast power of the null, however, is beaten by a significant margin by the end
of 2006 for both the quarterly and annual CVDr-based forecasts.
In short, the results are consistent with the mispricing hypothesis that CVD is negatively
related to future market excess returns. The results are inconsistent with the risk hypothesis
which predicts a positive relationship between CVD and subsequent aggregate returns.
B. Forecasting beta/volatility portfolio returns
Tests of Hypothesis I uncover a strong negative relationship between CVD and subsequent
aggregate returns and suggest that mispricing is likely the dominate force in driving the
dispersion-return relationship. I proceed to test Hypothesis II, which posits a stronger nega-
tive CVD-return relation among riskier stocks under the mispricing hypothesis but a stronger
positive dispersion-return relation under the risk hypothesis.
For measures of risk, I use market beta (BETA) and total return volatility (VOL). BETA
is estimated from a market model on 36 to 60 monthly available returns in the 5 years before
July of year t. VOL is the standard deviation of 10 to 12 monthly returns before July of
year t. After excluding stocks with prices less than $5, I sort the stocks in the end of each
June into equal-number BETA quintiles and VOL quintiles. Changing the breakpoints or
including low price stocks does not materially change the results. I use CVD or CVDr,
measured at the end of June of year t, to forecast the value-weighted monthly beta/volatility
quintile returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Based on the mispricing hypothesis, I
expect a stronger negative dispersion-return relation among firms with larger beta or greater
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return volatility. In contrast, based on the risk hypothesis, I expect a stronger positive
dispersion-return relation among these sets of firms.
1. Two-way sorts
Before running regression, I conduct two-way sorts following Baker and Wurgler (2006) to
examine which quintile of stocks are more affected by changes in CVD. Stocks are first sorted
into BETA or VOL quintiles as described previously. Then the BETA and VOL quintiles
monthly returns are sorted into two states based on the beginning-of-period CVD. In one
state, CVD is above the sample mean while in the other CVD is below the sample mean.20
The mispricing hypothesis predicts a greater return reduction among riskier stocks, when
CVD switches from the low to the high state, while the risk hypothesis predicts the opposite.
—–INSERT TABLE 3 HERE—–
The two-way sort results, reported in Table 3, support the mispricing hypothesis. When
moving from the low to the high CVD state, the return generally monotonically decreases
across the quintiles; the decrease is the greatest among the highest BETA or VOL quintile
and the smallest among the lowest quintiles. More interestingly, we see opposite return
patterns across the two CVD states. During the low CVD states, the highest beta quintile
overperforms the lowest beta quintile by 0.36% per month, or 4.32% per annum. In contrast,
during the high CVD states, the highest beta quintile underperforms the lowest beta quintile
by 0.43%, or 5.16% per annum. Similarly, the return differential between the highest VOL
quintile and the lowest quintile is 0.69% per month during low CVD periods, but −0.16%
per month during high CVD periods.
—–INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE—–
20According to Baker and Wurgler (2006), the two-way sorts help uncover the cross-sectional return pat-
terns in the sample. However, since it involves using the full sample information to conduct the sorts, the
long-short strategies presented in Table 3 are not tradable. To evaluate the validity of the long-short strat-
egy, I also conduct sorts based on the change in CVD relative to its historical mean and find qualitatively
similar results. This method, however, classify disproportionately more years into the low CVD states and
less years into the high CVD states. Thus, I choose to report the sorts based on the full sample mean CVD.
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The results imply a trading strategy conditional on the state of CVD: when the beginning-
of-period CVD is relatively low, the portfolio is long on the highest BETA/VOL quintile;
when CVD is high, it is long on the lowest BETA/VOL quintile, which I call “CVD-
contingent” BETA/VOL strategies. These two strategies can potentially beat a naive buy-
and-hold strategy on the market portfolio. To compare the three, I calculate the cumulative
payoffs in the two strategies, assuming a $1,000 investment is made in June 1965. In the
naive buy-and-hold strategy, the investment grows with returns on the value-weighted mar-
ket portfolio. In the two CVD-based on strategies, when the end-of-June CVD is below its
historical mean, the money is invested with the highest value-weighted BETA/VOL quintile;
and, otherwise, with the lowest BETA/VOL quintile. I plot the cumulative dollar pay-
offs over time for the three strategies in Panel C of Figure 4. The results show that the
CVD-contingent strategies significantly outperform the naive buy-and-hold strategy. Over a
42-year period, the $1000 grows to $65,417 with the market portfolio, to $142,630 with the
CVD-contingent BETA portfolio, and to $233,502 with the CVD-contingent VOL portfolio.
So, in real time, an investor could have been much better off through the CVD-contingent
strategies.
The results confirm the predictions of the mispricing hypothesis: an increase in CVD
causes a greater reduction in returns on riskier stocks. In particular, when beginning-of-
period CVD is relatively low—suggesting less investor overconfidence and smaller aggregate
mispricing—the cross section of return patterns reflect a positive risk-return trade-off. In
contrast, when the beginning-of-period CVD is relatively high—indicating greater investor
overconfidence and larger aggregate mispricing—the cross section of returns show no or even
an anomalous negative risk-return trade-off.
2. Predicting portfolio returns using CVD
The results from the two-way sorts are further confirmed in regression analyses. To compare
the difference in return sensitivity to change in dispersion, I regress monthly returns of each
BETA or VOL quintile on CVD and then look for the cross-sectional patterns of the CVD
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coefficients and test whether the coefficient is significantly different between the two extreme
quintiles.
——–INSERT TABLE 4 HERE——–
Table 4 confirms the mispricing hypothesis. The coefficients of CVD are all negative;
they are the most negative for the highest BETA or VOL quintile and the least negative
for the lowest quintile. The CVD coefficient on the long-short BETA portfolio is −0.59,
suggesting that a one-standard-deviation increase in CVD on average reduces the highest
beta quintile returns by 8.71% (i.e., −0.59% × 1.23 × 12) per annum more than that of
the lowest beta quintile returns. And the CVD coefficient on the long-short VOL portfolio
is −0.86, representing even a greater impact of CVD on the cross section of VOL quintile
returns.
Although CVD is shown to distinctively influence firms with different beta or volatility, it
is possible that the differences in sensitivity are only due to differences in firms’ exposure to
other systematic risk factors. Therefore, I run the predictive regressions by adding multiple
contemporaneous risk factors. I consider three multifactor models: the 3-factor model (Fama
and French (1993)), the 4-factor model (Carhart (1997)), and the ICAPM of Brennan, Wang,
and Xia (2004). There is disagreement in the literature about whether the Fama-French
factors and the momentum factor are proxies for risk or mispricing (e.g., Fama and French
(1995), Daniel and Titman (1997), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2005)).
These factors can possibly drive out the power of CVD to predict returns. However, if CVD
captures more misvaluation than these factors, the lagged CVD may continue forecasting
portfolio returns even after controlling for these contemporaneous factors. In that case, these
kinds of tests can at least distinguish whether CVD picks up novel effects beyond the well-
known comovement in stock returns. Nevertheless, including these common factors makes
the tests more conservative.
Specifically, I run the following time series regressions for each of quintiles and the long-
short portfolios, a method used by prior studies (e.g., Lewellen (1999), Baker and Wurgler
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(2006)).
Rt = c+ dCVDt−1 + βMKTt + sSMBt + hHMLt + ut, (11)
Rt = c+ dCVDt−1 + βMKTt + sSMBt + hHMLt +mUMDt + ut, (12)
Rt = c+ dCVDt−1 + βMKTt + b∆γt + e∆ηt + ut, (13)
where MKT is the market excess returns, ∆γ is the estimated innovation in the instantaneous
real interest rate, and ∆η is the estimated innovation in the instantaneous market Sharpe
ratio. Regression (11) controls for the FF 3 factors, Regression (12) controls for the 4 factors,
and Regression (13) controls for the innovations in the two state variables in addition to the
market factor in the BWX ICAPM. The time series from 1963 to 2006 of the FF 3 factors
and the momentum factor are obtained from French’s website. The time series of both ∆γ
and ∆η are obtained from Yihong Xia’s website up to the end of 2001.
Panels B, C, and D in Table 4 report the results. It can be seen that the three specifi-
cations yield similar results. The CVD coefficients turn positive among quintiles with lower
BETA or VOL and remain negative among quintiles with higher BETA or VOL. Never-
theless, the difference in CVD coefficients between the highest and the lowest quintiles all
remain negative and statistically significant, suggesting a greater impact of CVD on riskier
stocks even in the presence of contemporaneous common factors. Thus, the cross-sectional
differences in the return sensitivities with respect to CVD are not fully explained by the
cross-sectional differences in portfolios’ exposure to a set of known common factors.
3. Correlation with indicators of aggregate overconfidence and in-
vestor sentiment
The results have shown that there exists a negative relation between firm valuation dispersion
and expected aggregate returns, and it is stronger among riskier firms. These findings
support the mispricing hypothesis that dispersion is an indicator of investor overconfidence
and aggregate mispricing. Now I explore more direct links between dispersion and aggregate
overconfidence and, more generally, investor sentiment.
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As discussed previously, both theoretical and empirical research suggest that trading vol-
ume and idiosyncratic return volatility are associated with investor overconfidence. Thus, we
expect to see greater aggregate trading volume and higher aggregate idiosyncratic volatility
when CVD is larger. The monthly aggregate trading volume (TURNa) is calculated as loga-
rithmic total monthly shares traded over total shares outstanding of all available firms in my
sample. Due to the double counting problem in NASDAQ (e.g., Atkins and Dyl (1997)), the
trading volume from NASDAQ firms is divided by 2. The monthly aggregate idiosyncratic
volatility (IVOLa) is the equal-weighted average of firm idiosyncratic volatilities estimated
through regressions of more than 17 daily returns on the FF 3 factors within the month
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). Similar to previous studies (e.g. Campbell, Let-
tau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006)), I find an upward time
trend in TURNa and VOLa. To examine their correlation with dispersion that is indepen-
dent from the time trend, I detrend the series with a moving average of past three years, a
method similar to that used for the dispersion measures. I then examine the contemporane-
ous correlation between the dispersion and TURNa or VOLa through regressions.
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—–INSERT TABLE 5 HERE—–
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of regressing monthly TURNa and VOLa on
CVD or CVDr. The coefficients of CVD and CVDr are all positive and highly significant,
suggesting that aggregate trading volume and idiosyncratic volatility tend to increase when
firm valuations become more dispersion in the cross section, a phenomenon well predicted
by the overconfidence-based models.
In addition, prior literature suggests that overconfidence tends to grow after past trading
success due to biased self-attribution (DHS (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001)). For example,
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2006) find that trading volume tends to increase after
a period of good market performance. Thus, we expect that dispersion, which captures
aggregate overconfidence, should increase following a period of good past market returns. In
21I obtain similar results using Pearson correlations.
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a similar spirit, I regress CVD and CVDr at the end of each June on the prior three or five-
year CRSP value-weighted index returns. As reported in Panel B of Table 5, the coefficients
on the past market returns are all positive and statistically significant, suggesting that CVD
tends to rise after investors experience three to five year good stock market performance.
Finally, I examine the association between CVD/CVDr and investor sentiment index
proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The sentiment index incorporates six indicators of
investor sentiment, ranging from the close-end fund discount, IPO markets, aggregate share
turnover, to the dividend premium. Baker and Wurgler show that this sentiment measure
is negatively related to subsequent aggregate returns. More importantly, it affects returns
disproportionately more on firms that are difficult to value or to arbitrage. Similar to my
two-way sorts, in particular, Baker and Wurgler show that there is a positive volatility-
return relationship when the beginning-of-period sentiment is low, but a negative one when
the initial sentiment is high. This finding is quite similar to my findings from the two-way
sorts conditioning on CVD. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out to what extent my
dispersion measures are correlated with the market-wide sentiment index.
Panel C of Table 5 reports the results of regressing the annual sentiment index (SENT)
on the contemporaneous annual CVD or CVDr. The sentiment index is orthogonalized
to economic indicators by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The results show a strong positive
relation between dispersion and sentiment; the coefficients are all positive and significant.
More interestingly, CVD and CVDr appear to forecast the sentiment index at one-year ahead.
This predictive power remains even after I add the lagged SENT in the predictive regression.
That is, high firm valuation dispersion tends to coincide with and precede periods of high
investor sentiment. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the notion that firm valuation
dispersion captures aggregate investor overconfidence and market-wide sentiment.
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V. Summary and Conclusion
Over the past two decades finance academia has seen the discovery of many return predictors.
As evidence of stock return predictability mounts, the desire to more clearly understand
predictability has increased as well. This paper attempts to contribute to the growing body of
literature by documenting and understanding predictability, through developing and testing
hypotheses from existing behavioral models against those from existing rational models.
I find that, over the period 1963 to 2006, cross-sectional dispersion of log firm valuations—
including log book-to-market equity, log dividend-to-price, and log earnings-to-price ratios—
is a negative predictor of subsequent equity premium of three months to three years ahead,
and makes better forecasts than a naive model in real time. This predictability is more
pronounced among riskier firms: those with larger beta and higher return volatility. More
interestingly, in periods following high beginning-of-period dispersion, a positive risk-return
trade-off in the cross section diminishes and even reverses out.
These results are less likely to be explained by a few risk-based models, and are better un-
derstood with existing overconfidence-based models that dispersion can increase with market
mispricing, negatively forecast equity premium, and sometimes alter the positive risk-return
relation in the cross section. While this paper sets up a simple framework to distinguish a
behavioral explanation from a risk-based explanation for the aggregate return predictability,
one should not interpret the evidence as incompatible with any risk-based models. Instead,
my evidence only highlights the potential importance of understanding higher moments of
firm characteristics from the perspective of rational risk premiums.
For behavioral research, this work uncovers interesting links between cross-sectional prop-
erties of firm valuations, aggregate trading, idiosyncratic volatility, past trading outcomes,
and investor sentiment. Thus, higher moments of cross-sectional firm valuation ratios, as
indicators of investor sentiment, may deserve a closer look in the future.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Solution to equilibrium price
Following DHS (2001), before I solve for the equilibrium price of individual securities, I
first solve for the equilibrium price of the factor portfolio, which is constructed to have an
expected payoff of zero and a loading of one on the common factor F . The equilibrium price
of the factor portfolio is given by
P = µRC − Aσ2RCQ, (A-1)
where µRC = γµC + (1− γ)µR = µR + γl, γ = σ
2
R
σ2R + σ
2
C
, and σ2RC =
2σ2Rσ
2
C
σ2R + σ
2
C
.
In equation (A-1), the first term is an weighted average expected factor cash flows of
two investor groups. The second term is the price discount for risk, in which the conditional
factor volatility is determined by the average perceived volatility of two investor groups. Due
to the single factor payoff structure, the factor portfolio can also be defined as the market
portfolio, and then the price of the market portfolio Pm is equal to P .
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Equation (A-1) suggests two distinct effects of overconfidence. First, overconfidence
generates biased estimation of the expected cash flow. I define the factor cash flow mean
bias (denoted as M) as the difference between investor expected factor cash flow and the
true expected factor cash flow (i.e., M = µRC−µR = γl). The magnitude of mean bias, |M |,
increases as overconfidence (measured by vC) rises. I call this the “mean bias effect.” Second,
overconfidence leads to lower perceived cash flow volatility. Since overconfident investors
overestimate the accuracy of their signals, they tend to underestimate risk and require a
smaller risk premium than fully rational investors. I call this the “risk premium reduction
effect.” The combination of the mean bias effect and the risk premium reduction effect gives
rise to a negative relation between firm valuation dispersion and expected aggregate returns.
Proof of Proposition 1
22When N is large enough, the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away in the market portfolio.
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Since σ(β) is a constant, for brevity, I assume that it is equal to one in all proofs without
loss of generality. Thus,
E[σˆ(C − P )] =
∫ S∗
−∞
(pi −M)f(S)dS +
∫ +∞
S∗
(M − pi)f(S)dS
=
∫ S∗
−∞
pif(S)dS −
∫ +∞
S∗
pif(S)dS +
∫ +∞
S∗
Mf(S)dS −
∫ S∗
−∞
Mf(S)dS,
where S∗ = 2AQ
v + vR
v(vC − vR) and M(S
∗) = pi. When S is greater than S∗ or less than −S∗,
|M | > pi, the mean bias effect dominates the risk premium reduction effect in determining
firm valuation dispersion. Conversely, when S is between −S∗ and S∗, pi > |M |, the risk
premium reduction effect dominates.
Further, let ω = 1/(2v + vC + vR), and M∗ = M(S∗), taking derivative with respect to
vC yields
∂E[σ˜(C − P )]
∂vC
= −ωpi [2F (S∗)− 1] + 2∂S
∗
∂vC
pif(S∗)− 2∂S
∗
∂vC
M∗f(S∗)
+
∫ +∞
S∗
vω2Sf(S)dS −
∫ S∗
−∞
vω2Sf(S)dS
= vω2
{∫ +∞
S∗
Sf(S)dS −
∫ S∗
−∞
Sf(S)dS − 2AQ
v
[2F (S∗)− 1]
}
If this derivative is greater than zero, then that in brace must be positive since vω2 is positive.
All else equal, this inequality becomes more likely to hold when overconfidence is strong.
To see that this derivative is positive when vC is large enough, let us denote the component
within brace as Ω, and taking derivative on Ω with respect to vC yields
∂Ω
∂vC
= −2f(S∗)∂S
∗
∂vC
(
S∗ +
2AQ
v
)
> 0,
since
∂S∗
∂vC
< 0. Thus, Ω becomes greater when vC is greater. Consider two extreme cases. In
Case 1, overconfidence is extremely low such that vC approaches vR. Therefore S∗ approaches
infinity and Ω is negative. In Case 2, overconfidence is extremely strong such that vC
approaches infinity. Then S∗ approaches zero and Ω is positive. Therefore, there must exist
a threshold vC
′
(0 < vC
′
< +∞), above which Ω is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let vC = vR so there is no overconfidence, the CAPM holds in this model. The expected
aggregate return is equal to the market risk premium, i.e., pi = Aσ2RCQ. It is easy to show
that
∂pi
∂A
= σ2RCQ > 0,
∂pi
∂(1/v)
= 2v2piω > 0.
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That is, when the risk aversion A or the factor cash flow volatility is greater (v is smaller),
the risk premium pi is greater. Since the expected aggregate return is equal to pi and σˆ(C −
P ) = σ(β)pi, greater risk premia lead to both higher expected aggregate return and larger
σˆ(C − P ).
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there are two assets that have market betas of β1 and β2, respectively, and
β1 > β2. Then the average expected returns are β1pi and β2pi. Hence, for a unit increase
in overconfidence vC , the average expected return on asset one is reduced by β1
∣∣∣∣ ∂pi∂vC
∣∣∣∣ while
that on asset two is reduced by β2
∣∣∣∣ ∂pi∂vC
∣∣∣∣. Thus, the return reduction effect of overconfidence
is stronger among asset one.
Appendix B. Decomposition of earnings-to-price ratio
According to Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Vuolteenaho (2000), log book-to-market equity
(b− p) and log dividend-to-price ratio (d− p) can be approximated by
b− pt−1 =
∞∑
j=0
ρjrt+j +
∞∑
j=0
ρj(−roet+j) + c; (B-1)
d− pt−1 =
∞∑
j=0
ρjrt+j +
∞∑
j=0
ρj(−∆dt+j) + c; (B-2)
(B-3)
where ρ is a time discount factor and usually set as close to one (Polk, Thompson, and
Vuolteenaho (2006)).
Let D be the dividend per share, E be the earnings per share, P be the stock price, d be
the log dividend per share, e be the log earnings per share, and p be the log price. Further,
let δ denote the log earnings-to-price ratio, θ be the log dividend-to-earnings ratio, and ∆e
be the log earnings growth rate. Let r denote the log stock return, defined as
rt = log
(
Pt +Dt
Pt−1
)
. (B-4)
Substituting δ, θ, and ∆e into equation (B-4) yields
rt = ∆et + δt−1 + θt + log(exp(−(δt + θt))). (B-5)
I approximate the stock returns by a first-order Taylor expansion and obtain
rt = ∆et + δt−1 + θt − ρ(δt + θt) + κt.
where ρ is a parameter and κ is an approximation error plus a constant. If the firm pays
34
any dividends then ρ < 1, and otherwise ρ = 0. Rearranging the terms yields
rt −∆et − (1− ρ)θt = δt−1 − ρδt + κt. (B-6)
Using the linear form in equation (B-6), I iterate forward and express the EP ratio as
an infinite discounted sum of future returns less future earnings growth rates and future
dividend payout ratios:
δt−1 =
∞∑
j=0
ρjrt+j +
∞∑
j=0
ρj(−∆et+j) +
∞∑
j=0
ρj(ρ− 1)θt+j +
∞∑
j=0
κt+j. (B-7)
If we further assume the dividend payout ratio is a constant, then
δt−1 =
∞∑
j=0
ρjrt+j +
∞∑
j=0
ρj(−∆et+j) +
∞∑
j=0
κ′t+j. (B-8)
The above decomposition shows that the log earnings-to-price ratio is approximately the
sum of future returns less future earnings growth rates plus a constant.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the annual dispersion variables over the period 1963–2006.
The variables σ(b − p), σ(d − p), and σ(e − p) are the cross-sectional standard deviation of log firm book-
to-market equity, log dividend-to-price ratios, and log earnings-to-price ratio, respectively. The variables
σ(b−p)r, σ(d−p)r, and σ(e−p)r are cross-sectional standard deviations of the residuals from cross-sectional
regressions of each of the three log valuation ratios on their corresponding growth rates: log return on equity
(roe), log dividend growth rate (∆d), and log earnings growth rate (∆e). The variables cd(b− p), cd(d− p),
cd(e − p), cd(b − p)r, cd(d − p)r, and cd(e − p)r are the difference between σ(b − p), σ(d − p), σ(e − p),
σ(b− p)r, σ(d−p)r, and σ(e−p)r of June of year t and its average over a 36-month period from year t− 3 to
t− 1, respectively. The variable CVD is defined as the first principal component of cd(b− p), cd(d− p), and
cd(e− p), using information up to each month when CVD is formed. Similarly, CVDr is defined as the first
principal component of cd(b − p)r, cd(d − p)r, and cd(e − p)r, using only prior information. The variables
b− p, d− p, and e− p are defined as, respectively, log aggregate book-to-market equity, log dividend-to-price
ratios, and log earnings-to-price ratios relative to its long-run trend. For example, aggregate book-to-market
equity is the value-weighted average of firm book-to-market equity. For each month from June of year t to
May of t+1, the variable b−p is defined as the log aggregate book-to-market equity ratio minus its monthly
average from year t− 3 to year t− 1.
Panel A: Summary statistics of annual dispersion measures
Variable Obs Mean Std AR(1) Variable Obs Mean Std AR(1)
σ(b− p) 44 0.93 0.14 0.81 cd(b− p) 43 −0.03 0.11 0.56
σ(d− p) 44 1.00 0.16 0.90 cd(d− p) 43 0.00 0.07 0.60
σ(e− p) 44 0.93 0.14 0.80 cd(e− p) 43 −0.02 0.10 0.45
CVD 43 −0.55 1.23 0.51
σ(b− p)r 43 0.84 0.12 0.79 cd(b− p)r 42 −0.03 0.10 0.59
σ(d− p)r 43 0.89 0.13 0.83 cd(d− p)r 42 0.00 0.07 0.51
σ(e− p)r 43 0.81 0.12 0.74 cd(e− p)r 42 −0.03 0.10 0.50
CVDr 42 −0.77 1.16 0.51
Panel B: Correlations of annual dispersion measures
cd(b− p) cd(d− p) cd(e− p) CVD cd(b− p)r cd(d− p)r cd(e− p)r CVDr
cd(b− p) 1.00
cd(d− p) 0.66 1.00
cd(e− p) 0.92 0.74 1.00
CVD 0.89 0.84 0.93 1.00
cd(b− p)r 0.96 0.62 0.87 0.85 1.00
cd(d− p)r 0.70 0.81 0.78 0.81 0.68 1.00
cd(e− p)r 0.93 0.71 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.72 1.00
CVDr 0.89 0.71 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.78 0.91 1.00
Panel C: Correlations with monthly log aggregate valuation ratios
CVD CVDr b− p d− p e− p
CVD 1.00
CVDr 0.95 1.00
b− p −0.26 −0.30 1.00
d− p −0.20 −0.24 0.91 1.00
e− p −0.15 −0.17 0.88 0.88 1.00
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Table 2: Predictability of market excess returns
This table reports results by regressing market excess returns on the lagged cross-firm valuation
dispersion (CVD and CVDr). The CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted indices are used as
the value-weighted and equal-weighted market portfolios. Subsequent one-quarter, one-year, and
three-year returns in excess of the risk-free rate are used as dependent variables. In forecasting
one-quarter returns, the predictors are updated at the end of each March, June, September, and
December. In forecasting one-year or three-year returns, they are updated annually at the end of
each June. Overlapping observations are used for the three-year return regressions. The coefficients
of OLS regressions are reported, below which in parenthesis are the two-tailed OLS p-values for
the intercepts and the one-tailed p-values for CVD/CVDr based on the randomization method by
Nelson and Kim (1993). R-squares are adjusted for degree of freedom. This table shows that CVD
and CVDr are negative predictors of future aggregate excess returns.
Panel A: CVD as a predictor
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
3-mon 1-yr 3-yr 3-mon 1-yr 3-yr
Intercept 1.43 2.00 7.91 2.57 5.16 16.38
(0.02) (0.44) (0.10) (0.00) (0.17) (0.02)
CVD −1.16 −4.17 −11.67 −1.00 −4.39 −13.19
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.11) (0.09) (0.01)
R2 3% 8% 21% 1% 4% 13%
Obs 166 42 40 166 42 40
Panel B: CVDr as a predictor
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
3-mon 1-yr 3-yr 3-mon 1-yr 3-yr
Intercept 1.29 1.13 5.82 2.39 4.44 15.71
(0.04) (0.70) (0.29) (0.01) (0.29) (0.04)
CVDr −0.96 −4.17 −10.53 −0.66 −3.57 −6.94
(0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.23) (0.17) (0.11)
R2 2% 7% 14% 0% 1% 2%
Obs 162 41 39 165 41 39
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Table 3: Portfolio Excess Returns from Two-way sorts
This table reports the average value-weighted monthly excess returns of the two-way sorts based on
BETA/VOL and cross-firm valuation dispersion (CVD). At the end of each June, stocks are first
sorted into BETA or VOL quintiles and the value-weighted monthly quintile returns from July of
year t to June of year t+ 1 are calculated. Depending on whether CVD at the end of June of year
t is above or below the sample mean, each BETA/VOL quintile is further sorted into two groups.
CVD is above the mean (CVD–H) for 1966–1968, 1972–1973, 1979–1983, 1987, 1990–1991, 1996,
1999–2000. Return differentials refer to the quintile return differences between the low CVD states
(CVD–L) and the high CVD states (CVD–H). The long-short portfolios (H−L) are long on the
highest BETA or VOL quintile and short on the lowest BETA or VOL quintile. All returns are in
percent. This table shows that, when beginning-of-period CVD is relatively low, risk is positively
related to the cross section of stock returns. However, when CVD is relative high, the risk-return
tradeoff becomes negative.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
BETA
Average 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.54 0.64 0.06
CVD–L 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.85 1.06 0.36
CVD–H 0.39 0.27 0.04 0.04 −0.04 −0.43
Differential 0.31 0.46 0.72 0.81 1.09 0.78
VOL
Average 0.54 0.49 0.56 0.69 0.90 0.36
CVD–L 0.75 0.73 0.81 1.02 1.44 0.69
CVD–H 0.22 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.05 −0.16
Differential 0.53 0.62 0.65 0.85 1.38 0.85
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Table 5: Dispersion, volume, idiosyncratic volatility, and investor sentiment
Panel A reports the regression results of the monthly aggregate trading volume and aggregate idiosyncratic
volatility on the end-of-month cross-firm valuation dispersion (CVD). The monthly aggregate trading volume
(TURNa) is calculated as the total trading volume over the end-of-month total shares outstanding of all
available firms in the sample. Trading volume is divided by 2 for NASDAQ firms. The aggregate idiosyncratic
return volatility (VOLa) is the average firm daily idiosyncratic return volatilities within the month, in which
idiosyncratic returns are calculated as the residuals from the Fama-French 3 factor model. Panel B reports
the annual regression results of the end-of-June CVD or CVDr on the past value-weighted market returns,
Rm, from year t − 3 to t − 1, or from year t − 5 to t − 1. Panel C reports the annual regression of
investor sentiment index (SENT) (Baker and Wurgler 2006) on CVD/CVDr or lagged CVD/CVDr. Two
of the predictive regressions also control for the lagged sentiment index. For contemporaneous variables or
lagged returns, the two-tailed OLS p-values are reported in parenthesis below the coefficients. For lagged
CVD/CVDr, the one-tailed p-values are reported based on the randomization method by Nelson and Kim
(1993). R-squares are adjusted for degree of freedom. This table shows that CVD and CVDr are positively
related to aggregate trading volume, aggregate idiosyncratic volatility, investor sentiment index, and increase
as stock markets perform well in the past.
Panel A: Explaining aggregate idiosyncratic volatility and trading volume
Dependent variable
IVOLt TURNt
CVDt 0.28 0.05
(0.00) (0.00)
CVDrt 0.31 0.05
(0.00) (0.00)
Obs 494 482 494 482
R2 23% 25% 7% 7%
Panel B: Predicting CVDt or CVDrt
CVDt CVDrt
Rm(t− 3, t− 1) 0.016 0.017
(0.04) (0.02)
Rm(t− 5, t− 1) 0.017 0.019
(0.01) (0.00)
Obs 42 42 41 41
R2 7% 15% 11% 22%
Panel C: Explaining and Predicting Investor Sentiment
SENTt SENTt+1 SENTt+1
CVDt 0.32 0.36 0.20
(0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
CVDrt 0.27 0.33 0.18
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09)
SENTt 0.50 0.53
(0.00) (0.00)
Obs 41 40 40 39 40 39
R2 14% 8% 19% 13% 40% 38%
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Figure 4: Out-of-Sample Performance and Trading Profits
Panels A and B plot the cumulative differences in squared out-of-sample forecast errors (SFE) between
the null model, which is based on historical equity premium, and the alternative model, which is based
on CVD or CVDr. Panel A forecasts quarterly aggregate excess returns using the regression coefficients
based on data from the beginning of the sample to the quarter when the forecasts are made, with the initial
forecasts starting from September 1984. Panel B forecasts annual aggregate excess returns, also using prior
information, with the initial forecasts starting from June 1985. An increase of the line indicates better
forecasts using the alternative model relative to the null. Panel C plots the cumulative investment payoffs of
$1000 invested in June 1965 through December 2006, based on three trading strategies. The buy-and-hold
market strategy invests in the value-weighted market index. The conditional BETA strategy is long on the
lowest value-weighted BETA quintile from July of each year to the next June when the end-of-June CVD is
below its historical mean (26 out of 42 years), and on the highest value-weighted BETA quintile, otherwise
(16 out of 42 years). The conditional VOL strategy is similar to the conditional BETA strategy except that
the quintiles are based on VOL. This figure shows that CVD and CVDr better forecast equity premium in
real time than a naive model and produce profitable trading strategies that beat a passive buy-and-hold
market strategy.
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